Insurgencies are political in nature and employ violent tactics to fulfill their political objectives. Counterinsurgency campaigns are often military in nature and employ military tactics to kill or capture the insurgents. However, if counterinsurgency programming was approached from an additional political or civil society perspective, opportunities for the demobilization and political integration of the insurgents could be identified, rather than looking only at opportunities for their eradication.

This assertion is supported by research and practical experience. The RAND Corporation recently reported, “At the foundation of counterinsurgency is the salience of the political dimension—in doctrine, planning, implementation and, most importantly, operational coordination” (Hoffman 2004, 2). A military maxim says it another way, “‘Ignoring the civil side of counterinsurgency… [is like] playing chess while the enemy is playing poker.’”

Political Dimensions of Insurgency
This political dimension has been borne out in actual experiences with insurgencies as well. For example, General Rene Emilio Ponce, defense minister in El Salvador during the height of the 1980s insurgency, stated that “90 percent” of counterinsurgency is “political, social, economic and ideological and only 10 percent is military” (Hoffman 2004, 5).

The experience of the United Kingdom in the late 1940s and 1950s is also relevant. That country became embroiled in counterinsurgency campaigns in places such as Palestine, Malaysia, Kenya and Cyprus. In these cases, British planners were forced to develop new doctrines and tactics to effectively conduct a counterinsurgency program that stressed the importance of political-military coordination. Their doctrine was based on six counterinsurgency principles, of which the political dimension ranked the highest: political primacy and political aims; coordinated government machinery; intelligence and information; separating the insurgent from his support; neutralizing the insurgency; and longer term post-insurgency planning (Hoffman 2004, 7).

A report by the National Defense University (NDU) describes insurgency thus: “because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this type of warfare [insurgency] is difficult to defeat” (Hammes 2005). The main difficulty is that “this type of warfare” primarily uses non-violent, “legally non-combatant” actors in critical roles. By using crowds, protesters, media interviews, the Internet and other non-violent methods, [these] warriors can create tactical dilemmas for opponents” (Hammes 2005, 6).

Insurgents in many theaters have employed a variety of political, psychological and informational tactics in their warfare. A CSIS report (Cordesman 2006, 9-22) identified the following tactics among others that are pertinent to the political process:

• Attack institutions of governance and security
• Create alliances of convenience
• Link to crime and looting—exploit the economic situation
• Exploit the ethnic satellite media and other traditional media
• Game the international media
• Attack other religious and ethnic groups
• Attack nation-building and stability targets
• Confuse the identity of the attacker
• Create sanctuaries for insurgents.

In countries such as Nepal, Colombia and Sri Lanka, insurgencies will continue to inflict violence on political processes that are otherwise peaceful and legitimate, de-stabilizing government and disrupting public services and order. The military option has not eliminated the Maoists, FARC or the Tamil Tigers for several decades. However, coupled with military tactics, counterinsurgency programs could also employ democracy development tactics to increase effectiveness.

A New Program Paradigm
A program for the political integration of an insurgency involves three key components: structures, messages and tactics. The strategy is to weave these components into an implementation plan.

Structures
Just as the insurgents employ alliances of convenience to accomplish their objectives, the “operational coordination” of the political and civil counterinsurgency must include both governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and international and domestic groups. The composition of the alliance should support the dual objectives of creating “wedges” between insurgent groups and diminishing popular support for the insurgency.

The political and civil counterinsurgency network that is assembled on the nongovernmental side principally serves as a vehicle for targeting electoral/counterinsurgency messages to non-violent supporters and civil society. Depending on the forms of technical assistance, the political and civil counterinsurgency campaign can provide a capacity building component for civil society organizations. The program could also facilitate the establishment of insurgency victims’ assistance and advocacy organizations. Surviving relatives, such as widow/widower associations, can give voice to groups that are severely affected by the insurgency.

Messages
Two forms of messaging emerge from this programming: motivational and wedge. The fundamental motivational message to be delivered is that elections represent the best alternative to violence as a means of achieving self-governance, peace and democracy. Wedge messages are those messages that point out the differing interests between various insurgent groups and reinforce areas of incompatibility among them.

The diversity of this network of organizations requires that different messages be targeted to each. The most effective message formulation can be achieved through public opinion research about attitudes on the insurgency by province, governorate or smaller geographical unit. Because the electoral process is being used as the message platform, message development to all of these groups must revolve around electoral and democracy themes.

Tactics
In addition to the creation of alliances of convenience, the following foundational tactics can be used to weaken any public support for insurgents: (1) build public confidence in the political process, (2) expose the suffering that the insurgency has caused, (3) complement regional/domestic media and grassroots information campaigning, (4) encourage political and sectarian tolerance, (5) provide international media with success stories, (6) expose the perpetrators, (7) provide employment opportunities in activities related to the electoral process and (8) engage the diaspora community in counterinsurgency activities.

Case Study: Iraq
Striking evidence of the political dimension of the insurgency in Iraq was demonstrated in the December 15, 2005, elections, which revealed that the insurgency was not monolithic.

The insurgency in Iraq was composed of six groups: Sunni nationalists, former regime loyalists (FRLs), Sunni/Shiite Iraqi Islamists, outside Islamic extremists, foreign volunteers and criminals. The Sunni nationalists include ordinary Iraqis with personal stakes in the insurgency. They are predominantly located in the Sunni-majority governorates. FRLs are most likely composed of former military personnel, members of tribes connected to Saddam, hard-line Baathists, former Fedayeen Saddam (a paramilitary group) and former agents from the intelligence and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special Security Organization. The Iraq Islamist extremists have emerged after years of underground activities during Hussein’s regime. The Sunni Islamists have formed a political wing, the Association of Muslim Scholars, while the Shiite Islamists are largely following the cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Sadr has taken steps to demobilize his Mahdi Army and participate in the political process. His supporters tend to be young and impoverished men from Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad and in Shiite cities in southern Iraq.

Loosely and unevenly confederated, these groups have different motivations and objectives for their participation. They are generally united in their objective to end the Coalition Forces occupation, but otherwise appear to have little in common. For the purpose of this analysis, these six groups can be divided into three categories of motives:

• those seeking to achieve governance (or political control);
• those seeking process destruction; and
• those seeking financial gain.

Stated another way, the first motive might be negotiable; the second motive is non-negotiable, and the third motive is opportunistic. As a result, the forces required to counter these insurgents must include political, military and policing resources.

For the December 2005 elections, insurgents seeking to achieve governance broke ranks with the foreign fighters and participated in the election as candidates, observers and voters. The level of participation in the predominantly Sunni governorates was impressive, with voter turnouts of 86 percent in Anbar, the hotbed of the insurgency, and 98 percent in Salahadin, the home governorate of Saddam Hussein.

Conclusion
The program paradigm presented in this essay blends democracy development practices with demobilization, disarmament and re-integration (DDR) programming. The objectives of current DDR programming are to re-incorporate ex-combatants back into normal society. However, while DDR programming often successfully re-integrates these insurgents economically, the political identity of the ex-combatant is not reborn. By recognizing the political and civil elements of reintegration (a cornerstone of democracy development programming since the early 1980s), this program paradigm offers many opportunities for sustainability and success. Moreover, by introducing this new paradigm into counterinsurgency campaigns, governments can call upon an array of new tools to combat insurgencies and then integrate their movements into mainstream political and civil affairs.

Jeff Fischer is senior director of the Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance at IFES.